This study asks the following questions: Is it harder to remember people from other races? And do these cognitive limitations have discriminatory implications? We conduct an experiment in a controlled laboratory environment. Participants are shown pictures of potential "candidates" of different races -East Asian and white -and each candidate is associated with a value. There are no systematic differences in the value distribution across races. They are asked to recall the faces of the candidates with the highest values. I find that people are much better able to recall candidates with higher values if they are of the same race. This leads to positive and negative discrimination at the same time: those at the bottom of the value distribution benefit while those at the top lose out. These results suggest that cognitive biases could play a role in the nature of cross-racial relations, in particular for racial discrimination, homophily and phenomena relying on repeated interactions and individual recognition, such as the formation and maintenance of social ties and the establishment of trust relationships.
Introduction
Remembering people plays a key role in many social and economic contexts.
Most of our daily interactions involve people we have met before and whom we will meet again: colleagues, friends, professional relations, acquaintances, local merchants, etc. Keeping track of people -who they are and what they do -improves efficiency. We do not need to "start over again" every time we meet the same person. In an increasingly racially diverse environment, it is relevant to ask: are we better at keeping track of people of our own race?
For example, if asked for a recommendation for a job, are we less likely to remember suitable people from other racial groups?
Of course there are many reasons why we may remember better some people than others: the frequency of interactions, our perceptions about them, etc. The question is whether on top of that biases in the ability to memorise and retrieve information about others may play a role as well. For economists the relevant question is how do people record and retrieve information of the type "Person x has productivity y". Identification involves mapping an identifier -a name, a face, etc. -to economically relevant information. For example, a job recommendation often involves remembering a name and a person's qualifications. If there are biases in memory, this could have important implications in many dimensions of life, for example for whom we form social ties with, whom we trust or whom we recommend for a job. There are many economic transactions based on repeated interactions where individual recognition matters. Limitations in memory could have discriminatory implications even in the absence of any relevant differences across races -for example in productivity distributions -and in the absence of any race-specific preferences or stereotypes.
This study provides a first set of experimental results regarding the joint recall of identities and economically relevant information, and investigates whether biases arise along the racial dimension. It is designed to serve as a benchmark and is conducted in a simple and neutral environment. The focus of this study is on facial individual recognition. Experimental participants see people, learn information about them in a controlled manner and then make a decision requiring recall. We provide a clean measure of the efficiency and discriminatory implications of memory limitations.
Facial recognition plays a key role in many social interactions. Often a face is all we rely upon to identify someone. Local merchants typically know their customers only by face, not by name or any other identifier. Professional conferences, business social events, interactions between teachers and students, or between students themselves, are all examples of environments with repeated encounters and where facial recognition is an essential technology used to identify others. But obviously, there are other technologies used to identify people -names in particular. What is important to note is that these technologies are likely to share common features, insofar as they are likely to be shaped by the environment we grow up in and by the nature of our social interactions. The general question to ask is whether the technologies we use to rembember and record information about others are more effective for people of our own race or culture than for other people and, if that is the case, how does this affect cross-racial and cross-cultural relations?
The idea that memory limitations in individual recognition may affect economic transactions has been almost unexplored in economics. This is surprising given the large interest in phenomena such as racial discrimination and homophily (the tendency to associate with people of the same race). To explain these phenomena, the literature in economics has mainly focused on the role of preferences (taste-based discrimination) as proposed by Becker (1961) and beliefs (statistical discrimination) as proposed by Arrow (1973) .
The implications of a cognitive racial bias in person recognition are related to those present in contexts of statistical discrimination. In these models, discrimination may arise in the absence of differences in the underlying distributions of characteristics (e.g. productivity) -through the asymmetry in information. Aigner and Cain (1977) and Cornell and Welsh (1995) propose models where discrimination arises through biases in the technology used to screen people and evaluate their productivity. They conjecture that employers may be better at evaluating the productivity of workers from their own race than other races and this implies that the information is noisier for people of other races. The result is a compression in the distribution of rewards: there is positive discrimination at the bottom of the productivity distribution and negative discrimination at the top. Similarly here, memory limitations result in noisier information. It can even be the case that people are perfectly informed about relevant characteristics, but the key aspect is remembering these characteristics and attributing them to the right person.
The most relevant work in that regard is by Fryer and Jackson (2008) , who propose a model of discrimination precisely based on bounded memory. 1 In their model people are sorted into categories and each category has a prototype -a unique vector of attributes. People keep track of the variation in attributes across categories but not within a category. People sorted into the same category are blended together. For example, they could be sorted into two categories: high-productivity and low-productivity people.
They argue that minority groups may be sorted into coarser categories than majority members because they are less likely to be involved in frequently repeated interactions. Again, this leads to positive discrimination for those at the bottom and negative discrimination for those at the top.
The question raised here is how people record and retrieve information involving an association between "identifiers" on the one hand (attributes that enable identification) and payoff-relevant information on the other. As we will discuss in the next section, we know that own-race biases arise in the ability to memorise facial attributes. But the question of whether biases and inefficiencies arise in information recall critically depends on the precision by which payoff-relevant information is recorded. Only if it is recorded sufficiently precisely, biases will arise as well.
The experimental study proceeds as follows. Participants are presented with a sequence of 24 pictures of East Asian and white people -whom I call "candidates." Each candidate is associated with a value. In the second stage they are asked to select 8 people among the candidates they have seen. They see pictures again but they do not see the value. Their earnings depend directly on the values of the candidates they select. These values have a neutral frame. They are a general measure of payoff-relevance and could be interpreted in different ways. In repeated games the value of a person represents the benefit from the interaction (and could summarise the relevant past actions of the player). In network formation games they represent the value from linking with a person and in labour markets they represent a measure of productivity. Moreover, these values are exogenously assigned by a random technology and there is no difference in the distribution of values across racial groups.
A controlled environment presents two major advantages in this context. First, we can strictly limit the consequences of decisions to the decisionmaker: the selection decision only affects the subject's payoff and the person who is the object of the decision (the candidate on the picture) does not incur any loss or gain by being selected or not. This rules out a role for otherregarding considerations, such as fairness or willingness to provide benefits to own-group members over others. Second, the payoffs associated with each candidate are fully controlled for and participants are fully informed about Here the only cognitive mechanism that can correctly map faces to values is memory.
The baseline treatment presents participants with an equal number of candidates of each race. The data show a clear own-race bias in recall.
This bias is most pronounced among white participants, who recall highvalue candidates from their own race much more accurately than they recall high-value candidates from other races (66% of the white candidates with a value among the eight highest values are selected against 50% for East-Asian candidates). Second, participants select an equal number of candidates of each race -4 on average. Thus, we find evidence of positive and negative racial discrimination at the same time. Higher ranked candidates of the other race are less likely to be selected, but the opposite is true for lower ranked candidates.
I also investigate an interesting dual aspect of cross-race re-identification, which is that race might enhance identification when there are few people of a particular race (in a crowd of white people, an East-Asian man will stand out). Race has been found to be a prime characteristic encoded about others (Montepare and Opeyo (2002) ). It is a distinctive attribute -and distinctiveness has been found to enhance re-identification (Shepherd et al. 
The Own-Race Bias in Facial Recognition
There is a well-established literature in psychology on the "own-race bias" in facial recognition -the fact that people are better at remembering faces of people of their own race than other races (see Meissner We do not know how people memorise payoff-relevant information and map this information to the corresponding identifiers. As we shall argue later, it
is not clear at all that own-race biases should be as large or even arise. But obviously, the findings on the own-race bias in facial recognition are relevant for our study, so we review this literature in some detail.
Psychologists and neuropsychologists have extensively studied the cognitive and neurological processes involved in facial recognition (see Duchaine Thus, in a situation where race is a scarce attribute, it could serve as an obvious marker of identity and improve recognition significantly.
Recent work suggests that face recognition develops with age. Pascalis O. et al. (2002) showed that 6-month old infants, 9-month old infants and adults were able to discriminate between human faces but only 6-month-olds could discriminate between monkey faces. This phenomenon is similar to the loss of sensitivity to phonemes not used in the infant's native language (Werker and Tees (1984) , Kuhl (1992) , Aislin et al (1998)). Differential processing of faces of different races follows a similar developmental course.
As mentioned earlier, to understand the economic implications of cognitive biases in re-identification, one needs to study the joint recall of identities and payoff-relevant information -how people record and retrieve information of the type "Person x has productivity y". The most relevant studies in psychology are those that study the recall of associations between faces and information. The seminal work in that area is Taylor et al. (1978) , who study how participants recall the contents of interactions between people of mixed gender and race ("Who said What? ") 2 . They show that participants are more likely to misattribute statements of people of the same race than different races. To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies providing evidence on how people memorize identities and payoff-relevant information.
Payoff-relevance introduces a specific nature to information: it is a cardinal measure, which possibly commands a specific way of recording and organising information. As we shall argue later, it is not clear that own-race biases in information recall would necessarily arise.
Experimental Design
The experiment was conducted at the laboratory of the Nuffield Centre for The sequence is not automated at this stage and participants can go back and forth between pictures for 3 minutes. In case of incomplete selection (less than 8 candidates selected by the subject), candidates are selected at random among the remaining non-selected candidates to complete the selection (it turns out that in the experiment all participants without exception selected all 8 pictures themselves). Note that the sequence of presentation of candidates is randomized for each participant, and for each stage. The third stage is a lottery, whereby one of the candidates from the selection in stage 2 is picked at random. 5 The subject's earnings are equal to the value of the picture divided by 10, in British pounds.
Pictures of candidates
Pictures of candidates were drawn from a database provided by TAR-RLAB 6 These pictures show only the face of the person. Pictures were selected according to a number of criteria to guarantee homogeneity in shooting conditions 7 . The database contains 11 East Asian men, 15 East Asian women, 35 Caucasian men and 44 Caucasian women.
For each subject, a set of 24 candidates was randomly chosen. Two pictures of each candidate from a different angle were randomly chosen (one used in the viewing stage and the other used in the selection stage). This ensures that the task involves face recognition rather than picture recognition and prevents participants from using other cues than the face itself to remember the person. The sequence of viewing is determined randomly for each participant, for both the viewing and selection stages.
A picture of a mixed race person has been chosen to illustrate the instructions (see instructions in the appendix).
The values of candidates
A unique value was pre-assigned randomly to each candidate. The values correspond to random draws from a discrete normal distribution truncated at 10 and 70, with mean 40 and standard deviation 15. This range has been there were always 8 pictures entering the lottery. In practice, all participants selected 8 pictures exactly. 6 Face-Place Face Database Project (http://www.face-place.org/); Copyright 2008, Michael J. Tarr. Funding provided by NSF award 0339122. 7 All images were extracted from standard digital video (720x480), with the background removed and the faces scaled to be roughly equated in terms of size. The pictures were selected according to the following parameters: Race (East-Asian and Caucasian White); shave/stuble no make-up; no beards or mustache; no facial hair or visible make-up; no glasses; natural hair (no wig); neutral affect; orientations: 0 
Analysis

Predictions
It is useful to outline a number of implications of different models that could drive selection decisions in this context. I describe the implications associated with a memory-based model in the spirit of Fryer and Jackson (2008) and I contrast these implications with those from models based on preferences or stereotypes. I am specifically interested in implications regarding the probability of entering the selection and how this probability varies with the value attached to the picture.
Bounded memory
The simplest way to describe the decision problem is as follows. In addition to keeping track of the observable attributes uniquely identifying each category, the decision maker also needs to keep track of the payoff-relevant information. As a first step, suppose that she keeps track of the mean value corresponding to each category. In a small sample, categories will have different expected values. Note that one interesting empirical implication is the fact that candidates with very low values could have a positive probablity to be selected as well, because their observable attributes could sort them into a category with a high expected value. We find that this is indeed occurring (Fig. 2) .
In this framework, the optimal selection consists in first choosing candidates sorted into the category corresponding to the highest expected value.
Since categories for the own-race candidates are finer, it is more likely that the category with the highest expected value will be of the own-race. A second insight from this model is regarding the relationship between the probability of entering the selection and the value. Since the probability of entering the selection should be identical for all candidates sorted into the same category, the coarser the categories the flatter the relationship between values and probability of being selected. If there is no memory and just one category, then the probability of selection is identical for all candidates. In the case of perfect memory, only the candidates belonging to the top 8 should be selected while those outside the top 8 should never be selected. If we only have two categories, then there is a positive probability that a candidate with a value belonging to the 8 eighest values is sorted into the category with lower expected value. This is why the relationship becomes flatter.
The predictions so far rely on a specific structure of bounded memory, in particular, we have assumed that people compute and record correctly the mean value associated with the category. Since the exercise here involves a mapping of identifiers to information, it seems reasonable to assume that the information may also be recorded in a coarse manner. Both recording the individual information and aggregating it to the category could involve approximations and coarsening of information. For example, people could use simple heuristics such as "above the mean", or "above 55" and associate these labels to categories of identifiers. It is obvious that coarser recording of payoff-relevant information will wash away part of the biases predicted above. Take for example the extreme case where the information does not get recorded at all, then of course better facial recognition provides no advantage in better identification of those with a higher payoff. Own-race biases would also not survive here to heuristics such as "above the mean".
Biases will arise if the information is recorded in a sufficiently precise manner. But given the difficulties people report having in remembering contexts and information associated with faces, it is a priori not clear that own-race biases in information recall will be strong or even arise. The second model of discrimination is a model of rational or statistical discrimination based on negative stereotypes (Phelps, 1972 and Arrow, 1973) . Stereotypes can affect decisions in environments where there is uncertainty about the value of a person. Here the environment rules out this of the other race and should also lead to a lower probability of selection conditional on value. This implication contrasts with the implications of a memory-based model. Tables 1 and 2 present summary statistics of the participants. It is worth pointing out in addition that none of the East-Asian participants was born in the UK and the average time spent in the UK is 1.15 years.
.Preferences or Stereotypes
Analysis and results
Summary statistics
The baseline outcome of interest is the proportion of correctly allocated candidates-that is, the proportion of candidates selected among the candidates with the 8 highest values. The benchmark is 33% for random selection and 100% for perfect memory. Overall, participants did significantly better than chance, with a proportion of correctly allocated candidates equal to 61% (P = .000) 8 . The mean value of the selected candidates is 48 (S.E. .47), significantly higher than the benchmark for chance (40, P = .000).
Treatment Equality
We start with a simple figure (Fig. 1) presenting the average proportion of top 8 candidates selected by racial groups of participants and candidates.
The selection shows a substantial own-race bias 9 . The proportion of top Table 3 .
There are three conclusions to draw from these results. First, among the set of candidates with a value qualifying for the top 8, those with a higher value are more likely to be included than those with a lower value, both within and across race. Second, this effect does not eliminate cross-racial biases.
Higher ranked candidates (belonging to the top 4) of the other race are significantly less likely to enter the selection. There is a difference between racial groups of participants regarding the selection of the lower ranked can-didates (5th to 8th) of the other race. While for white participants, there is no difference between high ranked and lower ranked values, there is a difference for East-Asian participants. The bias seems especially present for higher ranked candidates (although the difference in probabilities of selection between lower ranked and higher ranked candidates is not significant).
Third, conditional on being in the top 8 or not, there is no difference in the probability of entering the selection according to race. That is, both white and East-Asian participants choose an equal number of candidates of East-Asian candidates and white candidates. This is important because it implies positive and negative discrimination at the same time: high-ranked candidates from the other race are less likely to enter the selection, but this benefits lower-ranked candidates (that do not belong to the top 8). Coming back to the model of bounded memory, an equal number of pictures of each race can be optimal but then if there are indeed coarser categories for the other race, the average value of the selected candidates of the other race should be lower than the average value of the selected own-race candidates.
This is exactly what happens. This result contrasts with what we would expect if negative stereotypes of preferences for own-race candidates would drive decisions. Both mechanisms have similar implications and should lead to, all else equal, a lower probability of entering the selection. We find that this is not the case. On the contrary, this result is perfectly consistent with the hypothesis of bounded memory.
To get more insight in the selection process, Fig. 2 and 3 plot the frequency of selection as a function of values. The prediction is that coarser memory for the other race should lead to a flatter relationship between the values and the probability of selection. These figures show that the slope of the relationship between the value and the probability of selection is steeper for own race candidates than other race candidates. We test this hypothesis more formally in Table 4 where we interact dummies corresponding to intervals of values with candidate race. We find that indeed values decrease the probability of selection but less so for candidates of the other race (all interaction dummies are positive). We conclude that the results are consistent with coarser memory for the other race.
Summarizing the results, the evidence shows an own race bias when there is an equal number of candidates of each race. This effect is more pronounced among white participants than East-Asian participants.
In that respect, it is worth pointing out though that East-Asian participants are living in the UK, and therefore might be a selected sample with respect to the ability to distinguish white candidates. 
Treatment Minority
In the second treatment, the composition of facial stimuli only includes 2 East-Asian candidates, a man and a woman. The hypothesis tested here is whether race and gender can enhance identification when they are scarce attributes.
The results are supportive of the hypothesis (Fig. 3) . The bias now takes the form of a minorty bias: candidates from the minority group are more likely to be correctly allocated than candidates from the majority group. Table 5 East-Asian participants select the same number of white candidates (7.33) and the same number of East-Asian candidates (0.66).
A measure of discrimination
Since we have detailed information about the values, we can calculate more precisely the discriminatory implications of cognitive limitations in the treatment Equality. That is, even though the candidates do not correspond to people actually incurring the consequences of the decisions, we can calculate gains and losses for each racial group of candidates. Specifically, we can distinguish between three types of outcomes: The results are presented in Table 6 . Not surprisingly, the losses associated with exclusions of top 8 candidates are larger than the gains associated with inclusions of candidates outside the top 8. As a group, the white candidates realize 94% of their potential when they are in the choice sets of white participants, while they suffer a 23% loss when they are in the choice sets of East-Asians. The relative losses are comparable in magnitude for white and East-Asian candidates that are in the choice sets of East-Asian participants (20% and 8% respectively). Thus, overall, the cognitive biases identified here lead to an overall worse treatment on average of other racial groups, but this effect is particularly pronounced for East-Asian candidates in the choice sets of white participants. 
Discussion and conclusion
This study highlights cognitive limitations in the recall of identities and payoff-relevant information and shows that these limitations are more pronounced across races than within race. These limitations lead to unequal treatment across races: negative discrimination at the top of the value distribution and positive discrimination for those lower in the distribution. This experiment is a first attempt to shed light on possible implications of cognitive limitations in identification for social interactions. As discussed in the introduction, these biases may have salient implications for the structure of cross-racial relations. Like a language, technologies used for individual recognition and identification enhance efficiency and seem to be developed very early on. In this context, understanding how these technologies de-velop and how they shape social relations could deepen our understanding of racial integration.
The current study provides a benchmark and aims at drawing attention to the phenomenon and its relevance for economic interactions. We think of three classes of applications where the phenomenon is likely to be relevant. A an alternative mechanism for racial discrimination.
These three examples of applications have been extensively studied in economics. I propose here a novel angle and argue that cognitive mechanisms may play a role in these phenomena and explain possible racial biases associated with them.
There are many ways forward from here. An important first extension is to study how these biases vary across ethnic groups and social environments.
Second, the experiment conducted here is in a non-strategic setting. One obvious extension is to study the implications of such biases in the context of repeated strategic interactions -for example, in a trust game. One could investigate whether these biases lead to differences in the sustainability of cooperation within and across races. Moreover, in a strategic setting, subjective beliefs about other players' abilities to remember may play a role as well. 11 Why bother being cooperative if the other players will not remember? 1 1 This point was kindly brought to my attention by Robin Cubitt Also, the study focuses on faces as identity markers. Faces are an obvious starting point because they play a key role in many social interactions.
A face is generally unique to an individual and cannot be altered or copied easily (Gambetta and Bacharach (2001) Finally, the environment I consider is extremely simple. The payoffrelevant information is captured by a single value. It would be interesting to study recall in a more complex environment, where the relevant information takes a more complex structure. Also, the bridge between the experimental task and real world applications is long. One could ask whether these biases subsist in settings where people interact with each other for a longer period and may also have access to external support to memory.
In my opinion, these questions deserve attention and careful analysis, in the laboratory and also possibly in the field. The main challenge of field experiments on this phenomenon is to find reliable measures of payoffs and possibly even measures of perceptions of these payoffs.
These challenges are left for future research.
